

SUBSTANCE OF A LETTER

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TO

LORD VISCOUNT MELVILLE,

WRITTEN IN MAY, 1815,

WITH THE OUTLINES OF A PLAN

TO RAISE

BRITISH SEAMEN,

AND TO FORM THEIR MINDS

TO VOLUNTEER THE NAVAL SERVICE

WHEN REQUIRED;

TO DO AWAY WITH

THE EVILS OF IMPRESSMENT,

And Man our Ships effectually

WITH MERCANTILE SEAMEN.

Published for the Benefit of the Maritime Institution.

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1815.

TO THE

RIGHT HON. LORD MELVILLE.

My Lord,

HAVING your Lordship's permission to address you on the subject of British Seamen, I shall take a slight review of our Marine, since the commencement of the war, in 1793, to this time. I shall also try to fix your attention upon the means of our retaining our rank of first maritime power; to which purpose it will be necessary to render ourselves equal to, at least half, or three-fourths, of the maritime powers united: and the experience of the late American war must have convinced even those unacquainted with nautical affairs, that there is but one means of maintaining a decided superiority, and that is to have always a sufficient number of regularly bred seamen.

In 1793 we had the greatest number of regularly bred seamen we ever possessed, arising from a peace of ten years—a time almost requisite to form able seamen; at least it will be universally admitted that seven years are necessary for that purpose; and a much longer experience is indispensable to the formation of officers.

At that time the fleets of our enemies were manned with many regularly bred seamen: also the first actions of the war were generally well contested by our enemies; but it was at that period when our ships were so well manned that our decided superiority became conspicuous, particularly after the victory of Nelson. The loss they sustained in seamen in that memorable engagement, combined with preceding defeats, destroyed the confidence of their men, and with it their pretensions to maritime power. But we must also date from that period the inattention to procure good seamen, arising from excess of security which was displayed in our own navy, with progressive effect, till the commencement of the American war, as well as the consequent disregard to the merchant service, both as to ships and men.

After this time, the Navigation Act also was not so particularly attended to as it ought to have been, making every due allowance for the circumstances of the times. Hence originated the cause of so much foreign shipping having been employed by British subjects, which was in many instances unnecessarily done; and unfortunately this

practice still exists to this day ; thereby preventing the use of British shipping, and the rearing of British seamen. The allowing ships to run with small force and few men : say ten guns and fifteen men ; whereas no ship ought to be allowed to run, in time of war, with less than sixteen guns, and from fifty to sixty men at least, constituted another cause of the decline of British seamen, and why so many were not comparatively reared as in the war of American independence. I knew one ship in that war to have had thirty-nine servants belonging to her ; which had of course the effect of augmenting the number of seamen. At the commencement of the late American war, when we had to cope again with regular bred seamen, (to use a seaman's phrase, we were taken all aback) it was then found that our ships, generally, were not manned ; that our discipline had not been regularly attended to : in fact, that we had not regularly bred seamen to man half the ships of our navy. When I say this, I am well aware that the American ships in general were of a larger size, had more guns, heavier metal, and were manned with seamen ; yet we had some instances where the only difference was, their being manned with regular bred seamen : but to those advantages we certainly ought to have opposed superior talent for command and greater expertness of discipline ; whereas this does not generally appear to have been the case. It proves what I have advanced to your Lordship, viz. that the character of a seaman is peculiar to himself, formed from early youth ; and it will ever raise him superior to other men, while acting on his peculiar element.

After twenty-two years war, when we ought to have to boast (if proper methods had been adopted) of having a greater number of regular bred seamen than this country ever before possessed, there never were fewer for the last sixty years than at the present time. The cause, there is no doubt, arises from the improper mode of impress, which is attended with the most wanton insults, both to officers and men of merchants' ships, through the improper conduct of your officers sent on that service, and of those to whom they too often intrust it, who are, generally speaking, the refuse of mankind. This irritates the minds of men ; and impresses on the minds of our youth an aversion to our naval service, which is seldom ever after eradicated. Both officers and men are torn, with such wanton disregard, from their ships, that the latter are left without help to aid them into port ; and when help is procured, it is frequently at a great expence to the owner. Hence the decided preference, in all foreign voyages, which is given to Foreigners over Englishmen, as men or apprentices.

Another cause of the evil, to which I have directed your Lordship's attention, is, that, in the war just terminated, the navy was more divided than at any former period, from the merchants' service; in consequence of which distinction, few, if any, brought up in the latter, could have any hopes of advancing in the former. The view of this subject fully, in all its bearings, I know will never be listened to by naval men; however, when France shall have acquired regularly bred seamen once more: and America a small navy, and a junction be effected between both, then the acknowledgment will be made, when it shall be perhaps, too late, that the superiority of your navy must arise from the merchants' service. As that period must sooner or later arrive, some regulations ought to be made which give seamen a chance of promotion, as they are more likely to prove efficient officers, than the generality of navy-bred officers are to become seamen. That it is too general a doctrine in the navy, that a man may be a good officer and not a good seaman, cannot be denied: that a man may perform as an officer certain duties, under the command of another, I can easily conceive: but that any man is fit to command a ship, or manage a ship's company of seamen, who is not a seaman, I most resolutely deny. The person exercising command should have no superior in that knowledge which is the first point of his profession, and on which his own judgment ought to decide; and this applies particularly to seamen, who, of all other men most despise their superior when he is deficient in professional skill.

Having had some opportunities through life to form a judgment of the education given to young men trained for the navy, I am sorry to say, few are taught the real duties and requisites of an officer, and few indeed the real duties and tactics of seamanship. This was fully exemplified in the general mutiny, when, to the best of my remembrance, I only read of one solitary instance of an officer having performed his duty under such grave circumstances. This will appear almost incredible, but, I believe it to be the fact.

I do not think, my Lord, that, with the present ideas of seamen, any mode for raising men for the navy without impress, can be immediately adopted; particularly at the commencement of a war, or in a certain emergency, although I have no doubt but it may be brought about in the course of time, by properly training the minds of our youth following the sea. Registering—men by tonnage—and giving a pension—three plans proposed before this time to do away the impress—all have their good points, yet as

the welfare of this country depends on her maritime power, and as there is a rising state consisting of people, the same as ourselves, having all the hardihood and enterprize of Britons, it becomes more than ever necessary to adopt some plan by which the youth who follow the maritime service, may be impressed with a love of their country; and if they are to have their rights and privileges, as Britons, encroached upon, it will be necessary to secure to them such rights and privileges as are connected with their profession. Besides, this is but a common act of equity and justice; and when it constitutes the only safe means of our navy, almost every other consideration ought to give way to it.

When I consider the expressions of men upon negro slavery, and the tender feelings they manifest on that subject, I cannot reconcile their indifference to the hardships sustained by the defenders of their country, to whose services, hardihood, and courage, this country owes its great political consequence mainly. What must be the feelings of men returning from a long voyage, having a wife, children, or friends, when dragged away, and, perhaps, sent off again, without seeing them, for years; and these men brought up with ideas of liberty! Compare their sensations with the feelings of a negro, whose ideas are contracted, and who is, more or less, a slave in his own country; yet our philanthropists, whilst they whine over the hardships of the one, appear totally insensible to the more exquisite feelings of the other. Upon the treaty of peace, I think, some expressed that they would rather have ten years of war than that the slave trade should not be abolished. I ask you, my Lord, if such had been the case, and these kind-hearted humane individuals had been called upon, or dragged away, to serve their country, if they would not have altered their opinion immediately?

Such being the case, who can blame the man that leaves the country where he does not raise those feelings of compassion, towards his situation, which are expressed for the native of Africa? Think seriously, and reflect, on what I have advanced on this subject, for it involves the continuance of our naval ascendancy, and consequently our commercial advantages. You must endeavour to dispense with foreigners; lay down fixed rules for impress, and adhere to them; and then you will have British seamen: this will prevent desertion, lower wages, and cause us to retain that superiority over other nations, which it is the object of the present letter to promote.

Having so far considered the cause of the want of seamen, and their aversion to the Navy, I shall now offer

what I conceive necessary to do it away :—1st. It is necessary, that the officers of the navy should be taught, that one of the first duties of an officer is to gain the confidence and good-will of the men by example, and regular conduct, for this is the foundation of good discipline. Example will always have ten times more effect than rules. They should also study and know the character of their men; and it should be particularly impressed upon them, that a correct and respectable deportment is requisite; for every instance of improper conduct on their part, is certain to alienate the minds of the men from their officers; and perhaps there is no description of people, who from their peculiar habits of life, look with a more jealous eye upon the treatment they receive, than seamen. To command them with effect, attention is requisite to their comforts, and as far as the nature of the service will allow, every reasonable indulgence of liberty. Although much has been done during the present war, to render the service more agreeable to the minds of men, by a relaxation of punishment and attention to their comforts, yet much more may be done without injury to the service. The language too often made use of (particularly by young officers) only renders them despicable in the eyes of the men, and irritates their minds against them. Sorry am I to say, that the youth training for officers in our navy, are not, generally, so rigidly attended to, by their superiors, as they ought to be. The merchants' service requires much more study to command men, there is no doubt, not having any particular code of marine laws for that service; another thing which ought to be inculcated too—I have seen men brought into a state of as good discipline by method and knowledge, as ever was done by the strong arm of power. Officers who go on board of merchant ships to impress, should preserve a respectful conduct to the commanders and officers; not only to prevent that irritation of mind which their conduct at the moment causes, but to guard against the bad example it offers to seamen and apprentices, when they see their officers treated with disrespect. What a lesson, when you afterwards expect from them implicit obedience.

When men are impressed, and more particularly when they enter, they should not be sent immediately on a foreign station, until they visit the port to which they belong; which might be done by permitting them to find a proper substitute, or to give security to a certain amount. There are very few, who will not be able to obtain one or the other. A certain time of liberty should be then allowed them.

The impress service should be confided to very different persons from those, to whom it is usually entrusted, and who are the refuse of mankind. A seaman never forgives the outrage of being seized upon by such miscreants; and so much are my own feelings injured when I see it take place, that I plead excuse for the man who deserts his country and friends. I am sorry to say, that this abuse too often arises from the shameful neglect of your own orders to officers commanding gangs, who leave it to men most improperly selected. A gang is seldom headed by a proper officer. The persons employed upon that service should possess a knowledge of seamen, with a great share of prudence.

When people are impressed from any ship, it should be the duty of the officer who performs that service, to afford the ship immediate help, and to take her into her destined port; and their wages ought to be secured to them whilst on board, and be under the controul of the officers of such ship.

No impress should take place abroad, except under the most imperious necessity, and rules should be laid down for its proper regulation.

No ship, bound to a foreign station, should be permitted to send on board of outward bound vessels, and take from them one or two men, as is too often the case at present, contrary to orders of government. It is also necessary that apprentices should be protected by some such rules, as I shall hereafter lay down; and if any officer transgress them, that he be amenable to punishment.

When men have served a certain time in the navy, according to rank, situation, and trade, they should be freed from impress, agreeably to certain regulations, different situations and tonnage of ships; making a difference between those who have entered, those who are impressed, and those who have left their country, during the time of war, to evade their services in the navy. Perhaps the following propositions would give the outlines to obtain the object in view.

The East India Trade, as now conducted, is a waste of men instead of raising them, having no apprentices as seamen (except officers, servants, and midshipmen are considered as such, which I do not): while they can sail their ships with foreigners and Lascars, no change will take place. This trade ought, at least, to raise as many seamen as it now gives you, instead of drawing upon the navy, or other trades, to answer its purpose.* What advan-

* It is an understood arrangement between Government and the East India Company, or the owners of ships, that each ship shall turn over in India a certain number of British seamen to the ships of war on the station: this is a negative mode of raising men for the navy.

toe government can possibly deem they obtain by the present mode, is beyond my comprehension. That it tends to impede the raising of seamen is sufficient proof against it, without advancing any thing further upon the subject. With respect to this trade, I should propose that, at the commencement of a war, the first and second officer be exempt from the impress, either on board or on shore. If the third officer had served one year in the navy, prior to that time, he should also be exempt. The fourth officer, two years; the fifth and sixth officers of all ships above six hundred tons, three years; boatswains, carpenters, and gunners, four years; cooks, stewards, &c. six years; seamen, eight years; and, if it should be necessary to retain them one year longer, in that case they should be allowed double wages. All those who fill such situations at the commencement of a war, not having served in the navy during war, provided they enter into that service, should be discharged at the end of the periods above mentioned, but if impressed, then two years more to be allowed for exemption. Every ship should carry one apprentice, during time of war, for every fifty tons of tonnage: half of whom should be indentured, from seventeen years and upwards, for three years; and no apprentice should be impressed under the age of twenty, if he has not been five years at sea. All men who leave their country during time of war, and go into foreign service, or that are in foreign service, and do not return within a limited time, should be liable to double servitude, if impressed.

In the West India trade, the first mate should be exempt as above; the second mate at the expiration of three years; in ships of five hundred tons and upwards, third mate, four years; boatswains and carpenters, five years; gunners, stewards, and cooks, seven years; seamen, eight years; and the same regulation should apply to all other ships trading southward of the Canaries.

The West India Dock system at present, with respect to apprentices, causes the loss of, at least, one thousand seamen annually.

In the American, Mediterranean, and Baltic trades, the first mate, if he has served one year in the navy, should be exempt from the impress; second mate, four years; boatswains and carpenters, six years; gunners, stewards, and cooks, seven years; seamen, eight years, &c.

In the Coal and Coasting Trades, first mate, three years; second mate, five years; other officers, seven years; and seamen, eight years, &c.

No vessel under fifty tons should protect a master, except he has served three years in the navy, unless such vessel have two apprentices belonging to her; one of whom shall be seventeen years of age, or upwards, when indentured.

Ships employed in the Greenland trade and fisheries, should have regulations adapted for their purpose, suitable to the above; apprentices the same.

All running ships and packets should carry four apprentices to every ten of her complement of men, half of each class.

All ships under the British flag, sailing to or from Europe, should be manned with British born subjects, at least, to the extent of two-thirds of her complement, with their proportion of apprentices.

A certain regulation should take place with respect to men in all other water employments, for whom I do not pretend to offer regulations, from want of information on the subject.

Transports should have three apprentices to every one hundred tons; half of whom should be above seventeen when indentured.

Apprentices should not be allowed to enter into the navy, without the approbation of their masters; and, in that case, the unexpired time of their apprenticeship should not be allowed as a part of the term of exemption, and the regular bounty should be granted to their masters.

All men who have performed their service in the navy, agreeable to these rules, should have a decided preference, as long as their conduct deserves it, during, and after a war, in all shipping employments belonging to government, public docks, pilotage, &c. and the freedom of any town in the kingdom, where they might chuse to settle or reside after the war, should be theirs by right. No man should be allowed to transact the business of a ship-broker, by offering ships to the Transport service,* or sell for the Admiralty, or be employed in other naval government concerns, unless he has served the country by sea.

It would be desirable to institute public schools, founded upon voluntary contributions, in or near sea ports, devoted to the education of the children of persons actually serving in the navy; and even when their service expires, the education might be continued; but this must be regulated by the extent of the funds.

At the conclusion of a war, or upon the expiration of

* This business, report says, afforded to one Company, not seamen, during a part of the late war, from £5 to £28,000, per annum. I broke the chart.

time of servitude, the men should be conveyed, free of expense, to their nearest place of residence.

That no ship should be allowed to sail outwards, at the commencement of a war, with more than one third foreigners, for the first two years; one fourth for the third year; one fifth for the fourth; one sixth for the fifth year; one seventh for the sixth year; one eighth for the seventh year; and the remaining period of war. This may be governed as circumstances require.

Four years actually employed in the merchants' service, should be equal to two years in the navy.

A certain portion of lieutenants employed in the navy, should be taken from those who have been brought up in the merchants' service.

All masters, and half the mates and midshipmen in the navy, should be required to have served three years in the mercantile service.

All trading merchant-shipping, in a political point of view, ought never to have direct taxes laid upon them, with a view, if possible, to restore the carrying trade we formerly had, but which is comparatively much diminished. This is absolutely necessary to keep up the number of seamen required to man our navy.

I offer these suggestions to your Lordship, under a strong impression of their utility; and I feel persuaded that the outline I have drawn, when systematically arranged, would, in the course of a few years war, supply the navy, to its full extent, with merchant-seamen; would conquer the aversion our seamen at present feel to the naval service; and be fully adequate to render it more efficient in officers and men, and blend the two services together.

I have no doubt some of my remarks will not receive the sanction of officers in the navy; as it is their wish to keep the services distinct. To their objections I would reply, that it was to an obstinate adherence to regulations, which should vary with circumstances, many of the evils which attended Europe since the year 1789, to the close of the war, were mainly owing. From this pertinacity on our part, Buonaparte derived almost as much advantage as he did from his abilities, enterprize and judgment; particularly in the first part of his career. To the same cause we might ascribe the loss of many thousands of men, and millions of money, in the West Indies. And the same may be said of the American war with respect to their privateers. Allow me to ask you, my Lord, if the Americans, or perhaps British mercantile seamen in American privateers, have not convinced us that their judgment in annoying our trade, was more than equal to the judgment displayed by our naval men in opposing them.

I make these observations to prove to you, that to have efficient officers, they must be seamen, and must possess a thorough knowledge of the naval and mercantile system. I am further induced to make these observations in order to shew the attention and manner in which young men ought to be brought up, to enable them to take the command of seamen and nautical affairs; and, unless the change begins here, it would be vain to expect any improvement in the service. The officer who makes himself master of his profession, and whose conduct is such as to prove an example to all around him, is the only man to be entrusted with naval command.

By allowing men the liberty of retiring from the navy, at the expiration of a fixed period, it will prevent them from leaving the country at the commencement of a war; it will also have the effect, to induce them to enter freely; and greatly lessen the temptation to desert. In this case they will have an object in view, *after* a certain servitude, which, commenced at the early part of life, will not appear long; particularly to respectable young men, who look forward to promotion in the merchants service; and who will have ties upon them to keep them in the country. These will not now enter into the sea-service, from having fear of being impressed, and their hopes blasted through life.

The motive I have in proposing that officers in employ should only enter for a given time, and allow their places to be filled with men that have served in the navy, and who should be afterwards exempt, is, that we may have men to train our youth as seamen, whom we have not had for a number of years. By fixing the period of service at nearly three years, no loss will accrue, as their places will be filled, at the expiration of that period, by the first class of apprentices; and, when the time of their discharge arrives, many of them will, no doubt, remain in the service; as it will be difficult for all of them to get employment in merchant vessels.

I should propose, that the most rigid attention be given to rules laid down, on the return of these men into the merchants service, and that they should be free from impress for life. This will have more effect on the rising generation, than all the other inducements you can hold out: and, it will induce them, as soon as they obtain their freedom, to encourage others to enter the service, instead of raising their aversion to it as they do at present.

In recommending two classes of apprentices, my object is, to raise in the course of the three first years, when a few officers will begin to be discharged, a number of men, not boys, who, although not able seamen, will, in all

probability, acquire more experience in that time, than they would do in seven years in the navy. They will also be better adapted at that age, for merchant ships; fewer British seamen will be required in that service, whilst the arrangement would reduce one half, at least, of the foreigners now allowed to be employed. The second class of younger apprentices have been frequently impressed, at and even under eighteen years of age, after having been three years at sea, during which time they have hardly been worth to the owners the food they consumed; whereas, were two years more servitude allowed them, it would be greatly to the advantage of the owners, and tend to the improvement of the boys: as these grew up, the masters would take younger apprentices, so as, in time, nearly to man their ships by such means. A regulation to this effect, would, if the war continued, man the merchant service, after the first six years, with British seamen; and the overplus would be adequate to the naval service of the country in its fullest extent, and which then would have none but regularly bred seamen.

Not having the means of exactly ascertaining the number of seamen we have, I shall, by way of supposition, fix them at 160,000. I calculate that, at the commencement of a war, three-fifths of them would be at home, and in the coal and coasting trade; say 96,000, of whom, three-fifths, or 57,000, would enter or be impressed; which number I conceive, could be obtained in the course of a few months. I shall now lay down 10,000 as the peace service; to which if you add 5,000 marines; 5,000 landsmen, and 5,000 boys; you will have, at the commencement of hostilities 82,600. Before the end of sixteen months from that period, about 38,400 more may be obtained, which would make the number of seamen from the merchants service amount to 96,000. From the number left at this time, you might in the course of the next eighteen months, obtain about 16,000 more; which would produce a total of 106,000 at the end of three years; a number of regularly bred seamen, equal, I believe, to any that has ever been in the service. In that case, and allowing for casualties, there will be between 60,000 and 70,000 in the merchants service. At this period the first class of apprentices will be coming into service; and, by my calculation, it ought to raise in gross 32,000; but which, from casualties, &c. I shall fix at three-fifths, or 19,200. At the end of five years the second class of apprentices, who will generally be better seamen, may be taken at the same number. At that period you will not only have enough to supply the place of those you discharge, and about 7,680 beyond the

requisite number, but will continue to increase during the time of war, until, at last, foreigners may be dispensed with altogether. It will also have the effect of lowering the rate of wages; doing away the impress; prevent desertion and men leaving their country; rendering the minds of men satisfied; and of maintaining the preponderance of the country, by enabling her, for ages, to hold the maritime rank which she has at this moment.

I could offer many other ideas on this subject, to prove that the plan I now propose will answer the purpose required, if your Lordship will undertake to bring it forward: but I am well aware, that a plan of this nature, coming from an humble individual, is treated with disregard by persons in your elevated situation; though the information your Lordship may receive from naval men, good officers in other respects, is likely to mislead you on this important subject, and will be at variance with the propositions I have submitted.

Think, my Lord, on the attention which is given to form men, for the army, and on the exertions made by government to promote that service. If such is requisite, and so much depends upon the training of men to make them soldiers—I ask, you, my Lord, what man of common understanding can suppose, that men are formed to fill the place of seamen, (who only can be trained from early youth) by clothing them with a blue jacket and trowsers? This I deem an insult to British seamen; and that your department, for so many years past, should have paid so little attention to this subject, is beyond my comprehension. (I am not speaking of your Lordship's particular administration, but of several preceding ones). Surely some improvement might have long since taken place, in the manner of raising men for the service, and which might be more conformable to the boasted liberty of this country.

From my earliest youth, through the particular circumstance I once mentioned to your Lordship, I have always fixed my thoughts upon this subject; and the path of life I pursued, with the share of experience I have obtained, probably qualify me to form a correct judgment on this subject: and I dare pledge my honor and character as a British seaman, that your Lordship may effect this plan under advantages which were never before submitted to your board; which always felt an apprehension to commence any alteration, because all former plans went to do away with the impress, in the first instance, altogether. This you will perceive, I leave, for the present, as it now stands; only to be corrected in points, upon which your Lordship, I am sure, will agree to, on the

score of humanity. I propose no extra expence, rather economy, as the method will produce entered men—require fewer persons on the impress service—and do away, in a great measure, desertion. Such being the case, the former objections to an alteration of the system are removed. Upon those points I do not entertain the most remote doubt that the plan would succeed in due time, and answer all the purposes I have proposed.

The requisites of a great and efficient officer, are a penetrating eye, quick conception, extensive imagination, prompt action, and steady perseverance, with strong nerves, judgment, and experience. He must dare to act up to the rigid principle of honour in all his actions; never recede from the object in view, except where it is necessary, as the French proverb expresses it—*reculer, pour mieux sauter.*—Such qualifications form the officer and man of enterprize. Such was Buonaparte, but void of honor and principle. Such was our Nelson; and superlatively such is Wellington; with this difference between the naval and military commanders, that the ardor and zeal of the former led him more than once into error, whilst reflection has hitherto guided the latter.

I mention this, my Lord, to convince you, that though men may be brought up in the merchants' service, they are not without ideas to form the first rank of officers in your navy; and their experience as seamen must add, instead of diminishing, to the efficacy of the service, and consequently to the glory of the country. The greatest officers were always the most experienced seamen. Another great advantage that will also arise to the executive, by the adoption of this method, is, that it will not have so many applications to make young men midshipmen, who, as at this time, are a clog and expence to government; and, in the event of a long peace, the circumstance of their having been made officers, prevents them from going into the merchants service to learn the duties of a seaman; whereas had they been brought up in the merchants' service, with habits of industry, as seamen, it would have promoted their own welfare, and that of the country. What I have proposed in this respect, will tend as much to the good of officers in the navy, in time of peace, by fitting them for the merchants' service, as it would be in time of war advantageous to those in the merchants' service who should be called to serve in the navy.

I now take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship that, if these ideas should be worth your attention, you will lay them before two or three of the first men in the naval service, whose judgment is most equal to the sub-

ject, and will then give me the opportunity to meet them, to explain my ideas, and answer any objections they may make to the plan proposed. Should it meet your Lordship's approbation, I would wish you to allow me to name two or three who are versant in nautical affairs, to meet them also.

I am far from thinking my calculation, in the preceding statement is correct, in regard to numbers; neither can it be supposed that I can acquire the information on this subject that is necessary to a nice calculation; nor would my time allow it if so inclined: yet I have no hesitation in saying, that the principle on which my plan is founded will only answer the purpose required, and the magnitude and consequence of the measure can only be brought to maturity by men equal to the task; taking this as an outline whereon to form it; and if calculation is against the statement made, I am certain that in the two-fifths allowed for casualties in apprentices, will make up any deficiency there can be placed against it; and have no doubt but it may be applied to present purposes.

I am, very respectfully, Your Lordship's
Most obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS URQUHART.

Lloyd's Coffee House, 20th May, 1815.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE READER.

It is my intention shortly to publish another Pamphlet on this important subject, in which the evils of impressment that have not only befallen to myself, but are common to all seamen, will be laid open to the public. I ask all seamen to listen, and to hear me '*wind my call.*' The mere knowledge of the evils of impressment must give it a death-blow. In doing this, we shall do our king, our country, and mankind a service. There is an old saying, that 'one volunteer is better than two press'd men,' and I am confident, I speak as a seaman, that if once the evils of impressment, and those consequent to it, shall be done away, the British sailor, feeling his liberties regained, will, with a cheerfulness to which hitherto he has been a stranger, offer his services and even his life in the cause of his king and his country.

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